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I. INTRODUCTION
Outer space, the “final frontier” in the iconic Star Trek series,1 is the subject 
of countless science fiction books and movies that display humanity’s deep 
fascination with the possibilities of our species living among the stars. Many of 
these stories portray human societies more or less as we know them today but 
                                                                                                                     
* Editor in Chief, Ohio State Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, 2018, The Ohio State 
University Moritz College of Law; M.A. (Planning), University of British Columbia. After 
a lifetime of interest in astronomy and all things space, this Note represents my first 
professional foray into the cosmos; something I have approached both with excitement and 
no small amount of trepidation. To all of the people who have helped make this Note a reality, 
I am eternally grateful. I would like to extend a special thanks to Prof. Mohamed Helal for 
his patient guidance and thoughtful review of my early drafts. In addition, I would like to 
recognize the staff members of the Ohio State Law Journal, especially Courtney Kasuboski, 
for their role in preparing this Note for publication.
1 TeeVees Greatest, Star Trek: The Original Series 1966–1969 Opening and Closing 
Theme, YOUTUBE, at 00:00:06 (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIQsrv
W6Ji4 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (excerpt from Star Trek, produced by 
Paramount Pictures).
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transplanted to a different setting,2 while others imagine a dramatically different 
way of living once separated from the constraints of Mother Earth.3 Either way, 
an inevitable and necessary part of any human society in space is the existence 
of laws that govern our activities and interactions with each other and our 
surroundings, including the use and ownership of the natural resources found in 
outer space. These “space resources” are now at the center of modern space law 
debates. This Note examines how the subsequent practice of states, and 
especially the recent U.S. Space Resource Act, informs the interpretation of the 
treaty regime that governs outer space and space resources. 
The Outer Space Treaty,4 completed in 1967, originated in a set of 
principles5 that discarded a history of colonial competition and territorial 
expansion by nations.6 Instead, a new legal order was established for outer space
that was based on peace and cooperation among nations.7 This Treaty, with its 
visionary language and hopeful outlook, forms the foundation of international 
space law.
                                                                                                                     
2 See, e.g., ORSON SCOTT CARD, SPEAKER FOR THE DEAD (1986) (using as a setting two 
colonies on other worlds, one settled by Portuguese colonists and the other by Nordic 
colonists, that reflect the traditional cultures of the colonists).
3 See, e.g., KIM STANLEY ROBINSON, GREEN MARS (1994) (describing the emergence 
of a uniquely Martian society in reaction to Earth-based precedents).
4 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
5 The formulation of an international legal regime for space activities began with the 
adoption of two U.N. General Assembly resolutions: the Resolution on International 
Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961), 
and the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963). The primary elements of 
both were ultimately incorporated into the Outer Space Treaty.
6 See P.J. Blount & Christian J. Robison, One Small Step: The Impact of the U.S. 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 on the Exploitation of Resources in 
Outer Space, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 160, 164–65 (2016) (noting that the Outer Space Treaty 
separates “legal occupation from sovereignty” and represents an “anti-imperial or anti-
colonial” approach to outer space). Article II of the Treaty declares that “[o]uter space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Outer Space 
Treaty, supra note 4, art. II. This language makes outer space res communis (territory that is 
incapable of being made a part of any state) rather than terra nullius (territory that is currently 
unclaimed but capable of being acquired by a state through occupation and exercise of 
effective control). MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 363, 393 (7th ed. 2014).
7 Article III of the Treaty requires “States Parties . . . shall carry on activities in the 
exploration and use of outer space . . . in accordance with international law . . . in the interest 
of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and 
understanding,” while Article IV goes on to prohibit the placement of nuclear weapons in 
outer space, and to state that “[t]he moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States 
Parties . . . exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, . . . the 
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manœuvres on celestial bodies 
shall be forbidden.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. III, IV.
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As with any foundation, however, the Outer Space Treaty is only a starting 
point. It provides a basis upon which a comprehensive legal regime may be 
developed. After the Outer Space Treaty, four additional treaties were 
negotiated to fill in the details of various issues raised in the Outer Space 
Treaty.8 Three of these subsequent treaties addressed urgent issues faced by the 
parties as space activities accelerated through the 1960s and into the 1970s.9
However, one issue of prospective interest—the issue of how space resources 
may be used—was not resolved. Although an attempt was made to resolve it 
through the development of the Moon Agreement,10 the Agreement’s tepid 
reception and the failure of most spacefaring nations to become parties11 leaves 
the existence and nature of rights to use and own space resources subject to 
broad interpretation.12
                                                                                                                     
8 The four treaties are the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue and Return 
Agreement), opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, the 
Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability 
Convention), opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, the 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration 
Convention), opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 
[hereinafter Registration Convention], and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States 
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. 
9 See infra note 70.
10 Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11, para. 5 (declaring the intent of the parties to 
“undertake to establish an international régime, including appropriate procedures, to govern 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon”).
11 Currently there are only eighteen states parties to the Treaty, with Mexico and the 
Netherlands being the only parties with active space programs, and four signatory countries 
that have not ratified the Treaty, including only France and India with active space programs. 
U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter XXIV Outer Space: Agreement Governing the Activities of 
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Feb. 18, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Pub
lication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXIV/XXIV-2.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NR6-
XSTN]; see Introduction to Space Activities, SPACE FOUND., https://www.spacefoundation.
org/sites/default/files/downloads/IntroSpace_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/36T5-ZWT8] (last 
updated Mar. 23, 2018) (surveying the space programs of nineteen countries and Europe). 
This is only 9% of the 193 U.N. member states. Overview, About the U.N., UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/index.html [https://perma.cc/C769-LS2U].
12 Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz & Jacqueline Etil Serrao, An Introduction to Space Law 
for Decision Makers, 30 J. SPACE L. 227, 232 (2004) (“The most controversial example of 
unresolved issues [in international space law] is the issue of the use of resources in space.”); 
Michael Simpson, Future of Space Commercialisation—Mining Asteroid and Celestial 
Bodies, in COMMERCIALISATION OF SPACE 176, 178 (Bhupendra Jasani & Ram Jakhu eds., 
2014) (noting that legal scholars “differ widely in their opinions” regarding the question of 
“the right, if any, to own, possess, distribute and profit from mineral resources extracted from 
celestial bodies”). “[I]n the absence of any international case law on the matter,” Simpson 
concludes that “the absolute declarations of publicists about the legal status of extracted 
material cannot constitute a definitive answer to the critical question: ‘who owns it’?” Id.;
see also discussion infra Part III.
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This lack of definition regarding rights to space resources does not seem to 
have created problems so far, which is probably due to the lack of sustained 
interest in activities beyond Earth orbit. But now, after more than four decades 
out of the limelight, the Moon is again an object of intense interest with 
proposals for missions to prospect and begin mining its resources.13 This time, 
reminiscent of the Gold Rush Era,14 the private sector is leading the charge. 
Eager private enterprises have identified resources on the Moon with high 
commercial value, such as helium-3.15 Some companies are looking even farther 
afield, targeting asteroids16 and Mars.17
As the overall activity of private enterprises pursuing missions beyond Earth 
orbit has increased,18 so has the urgency of questions about whether investments 
in the enterprises proposing to mine for resources are supported by a firm legal 
base, in particular a legal environment that recognizes ownership rights in the 
resources obtained by such missions.19 In response to this situation, the U.S. 
Congress passed, and the President signed, legislation containing the Space 
Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 (Space Resource Act).20
However, rather than clarifying the legal situation, this new law purporting to 
recognize property rights in space resources obtained by a private party has 
                                                                                                                     
13 Ram Jakhu, Adequacy of the Law Governing Space Commercialisation, in 
COMMERCIALISATION OF SPACE, supra note 12, at 131, 140.
14 Simpson, supra note 12, at 182.
15 Sarah Coffey, Note, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural 
Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 121–24 (2009) (discussing the 
value of helium-3 and the likelihood of it driving future missions to the Moon).
16 Asteroid Mining: An Unlimited Future for All Mankind, DEEP SPACE INDUSTRIES,
https://deepspaceindustries.com/mining/ [https://perma.cc/JL88-6A5J]; Redefining Natural 
Resources, PLANETARY RESOURCES, https://www.planetaryresources.com/why-asteroids/
[https://perma.cc/N4YJ-FKRW].
17 Nick Stockton, Elon Musk Announces His Plan To Colonize Mars and Save 
Humanity, WIRED (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/elon-musk-colonize-mars/ 
[https://perma.cc/N7N7-BTD2].
18 See Federal Aviation Administration Oversight of Commercial Space 
Transportation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp. & 
Infrastructure, 114th Cong. 35–36 (2016) (statement of Dr. George C. Nield, Assoc. Adm’r
for Commercial Space Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin.) (“[T]he year 2015 was a record-
setting one for space ventures. The investment and debt financing in these enterprises totaled 
$2.7 billion, with more venture capital invested in space in 2015 than in the prior 15 years 
combined.”).
19 Simpson, supra note 12, at 177–78; US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness 
Act Signed into Law, BUS. L. BASICS, http://www.businesslawbasics.com/us-commercial-
space-launch-competitiveness-act-signed-law [https://perma.cc/VVV3-6DFD] [hereinafter 
BUS. L. BASICS] (quoting a commentator who indicated that investors are concerned “about 
whether they’ll plow millions (or billions) into a space mining company only to be told later 
that they broke the law”).
20 The Space Resource Act was enacted as Title IV of the larger U.S. Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act. Space Resource Commercial Exploration and Utilization Act 
of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-90, §§ 401–403, 129 Stat. 704, 720–22 (2015) (to be codified at 51
U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303).
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occasioned a spirited debate over whether it comports with the United States’
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty.21
Much scholarship has been devoted to interpreting the obligations of the 
Outer Space Treaty pertaining to space resources. Most of this scholarship has 
concentrated on an analysis of the text itself and the preparatory work that went 
into the development of the Treaty.22 However, scholars have been divided in 
their analysis of the meaning of the Treaty’s obligations. Now that the mining 
of the Moon and asteroids by private parties is an immediate concern, 
international space law’s lack of definition on the subject of space resources 
presents a real difficulty, not just an interesting academic debate.
Why does it matter? It matters because the very foundation of international 
space law is the promotion of peace and cooperation in outer space.23 The ability 
of humanity to avoid conflict resulting from disputes over space resources 
depends on how this issue is addressed.24 If the governing rule for acquiring 
space resources becomes “first come first served,” it is easy to contemplate how 
many countries may react negatively to being left out of a new resource boom. 
But also, the broader possibility of a reimagined human future in space is at 
stake. If we truly dare to envision a peaceful and cooperative future for humanity 
in space—the realization of the lofty aspirations articulated in the Outer Space 
Treaty—it is critical to clarify the meaning of the Treaty’s obligations and rights 
relative to space resources in order to avoid the prospect of conflict, or even war. 
In contrast to other scholarship surrounding the issue of space resources, 
this Note will analyze the broad, undefined terms25 in the Outer Space Treaty 
through the lens of the subsequent practice of the states that are parties to the 
Treaty. The analysis reveals that subsequent practice provides some definition 
to clarify property rights in space resources, but not enough to definitively 
answer the question of whether private parties are allowed to own space 
resources for commercial purposes. The Space Resource Act is a potential 
instrument of subsequent practice that the United States can use to shape the 
meaning of the unclear obligations. However, for this to work, this Note argues 
that the United States must implement the Space Resource Act in a way that 
other parties to the Outer Space Treaty agree is a good-faith interpretation of the 
Treaty. In this way, the United States will be part of a conversation defining the 
                                                                                                                     
21 See infra Part IV.
22 See infra Part III.B.
23 See supra note 7 (discussing Articles III and IV of the Outer Space Treaty).
24 See Eilene Galloway, Maintaining International Space Cooperation for Peaceful 
Uses, 30 J. SPACE L. 311, 314–15 (2004) (“Commercial space uses . . . could be 
accommodated as long as they are in compliance with the safety and order required for 
maintaining peace.”).
25 There are no definitions provided in the Treaty, which is especially problematic for 
critical terms such as “use,” “benefit,” and “province of all mankind.” Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 4.
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proper meaning of the obligations under the Treaty instead of potentially being 
viewed as defying the Treaty.26
Because a private company in the United States is now close to sending the 
first private probe to the Moon,27 the United States needs to implement the 
policy contained in its new law in a way that reduces the likelihood of conflict 
and the potential undoing of a half-century legacy of peace in outer space. 
Perhaps more importantly, the interpretation pursued by the United States
should truly embrace the aspirations of the Treaty. In doing so, the United States
could once again, harkening back to President Kennedy’s push to reach the 
Moon,28 demonstrate visionary leadership in the pursuit of a human future in 
space.
The analysis begins with an examination, in Part II, of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. This will consider the various methods used 
to interpret treaties and focus on the appropriate considerations for using the 
subsequent practice of states parties to help interpret treaties. Part III then 
reviews the components of international space law. In particular, the Outer 
Space Treaty is examined with a focus on the debate surrounding the application 
of its provisions to the question of space resources. These provisions will then 
be examined through the lens of subsequent practice. In Part IV, the Space 
Resource Act is examined as to whether or not it satisfies the United States’
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty. An argument is then made regarding 
proactive use of the Act to shape the conduct of other states parties. Finally, in 
Part V, several approaches are proposed that could be used to support the United 
States’ recognition of private ownership of space resources while more clearly 
satisfying the obligations imposed by the Outer Space Treaty. The suggested 
approaches are broadly intended to advance the debate on the meaning of Outer 
Space Treaty obligations as they pertain to space resources.
                                                                                                                     
26 See THOMAS GANGALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE: SOVEREIGNTY AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 38–39 (2009).
27 Moon Express expects to launch its MX-1E mission in 2017. U.S. Government 
Approves Plan for Moon Express To Become First Private Company To Venture Beyond 
Earth’s Orbit, MOON EXPRESS (Aug. 3, 2016), http://moonexpress.com/news/us-government-
approves-plan-moon-express-become-first-private-company-venture-beyond-earths-orbit/ [https://
perma.cc/F4UX-2MPM] (noting that “Moon Express received the green light for pursuing its 
2017 lunar mission”); see FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FACT SHEET—MOON EXPRESS PAYLOAD 
REVIEW DETERMINATION (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm
?newsId=20595 [https://perma.cc/94XV-MDGE] (“On July 20, 2016, the FAA made a 
favorable payload determination for the Moon Express MX-1E mission.”).
28 President John F. Kennedy, Special Message by the President on Urgent National 
Needs to a Joint Session of the Congress 9 (May 25, 1961), https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-034-030.aspx [https://perma.cc/59G2-VX3X] (“I believe that 
this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a 
man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in this period 
will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of 
space . . . .”).
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II. LAW OF TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)29 is an “essential”
source of international law governing treaties.30 Rules for the interpretation of 
treaties are contained in Article 31.31 Although written into the VCLT, the treaty 
interpretation rules are recognized to be a statement of preexisting customary 
international law.32 This means that Article 31 is generally applicable to all 
treaties even if they were concluded before the VCLT came into force, and even 
if the states parties to such treaties are not parties to the VCLT.33 This is 
important because it means the treaty interpretation rules are applicable to both 
the Outer Space Treaty and the United States, even though the Outer Space 
Treaty came into force before the VCLT,34 and even though the United States 
has not ratified the VCLT.35
Article 31 articulates the general rule of treaty interpretation, which requires 
consideration of the following four basic elements:
1. “[T]he ordinary meaning” of the terms of the treaty “in their context and 
in the light of [the] object and purpose” of the treaty;36
2. “Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;”37
                                                                                                                     
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
30 RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 6 (2d ed. 2015).
31 VCLT, supra note 29, art. 31.
32 GARDINER, supra note 30, at 13–20; SHAW, supra note 6, at 5 (explaining that 
customary international law comprises “state practices recognised by the community at large 
as laying down patterns of conduct that have to be complied with”).
33 GARDINER, supra note 30, at xv (noting that Article 31 “applie[s] to treaties old and 
new”); Luigi Crema, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice Within and Outside 
the Vienna Convention, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 13, 14–15 (Georg Nolte 
ed., 2013) (noting that Article 31 is “used in cases involving states not parties to the Vienna 
Convention”).
34 The Outer Space Treaty came into force on October 10, 1967. Bureau of Arms 
Control, Verification, & Compliance, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm [https://perma.cc/4TB7-NWQ5]. The 
VCLT came into force on January 27, 1980. U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter XXIII Law of 
Treaties: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXIII/XXIII-1.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6H5-JTK4] (last 
updated Mar. 23, 2018).
35 The United States signed the VCLT on April 24, 1970, but has not subsequently 
ratified it. U.N. Treaty Collection, supra note 34. Nonetheless, the United States “considers 
many of the provisions of the [VCLT] to constitute customary international law.” Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139
.htm [https://perma.cc/2XWV-JPT7].
36 VCLT, supra note 29, art. 31, para. 1.
37 Id. art. 31, para. 3(a).
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3. “Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;”38
and
4. “Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.”39
It is important to note that there is no hierarchy or priority among these 
considerations. The elements are considered equally important and integral to 
the interpretation process; an interpreter can make “no firm conclusion based on 
particular elements [of a treaty] before the process [of interpretation] has been 
completed.”40 It may seem logical to start the interpretation process with the 
terms of a treaty and then proceed through the other elements in the order they 
are listed in the VCLT. However, interpretation should be viewed “as a 
recursive . . . process that . . . spiral[s] in toward the meaning of a treaty” rather 
than a strictly linear process.41 As a result, the subsequent practice of parties is 
an integral, indeed critical, element of any treaty interpretation process.42
But what exactly is subsequent practice? Practice is an official act, or 
commitment to act, in response to a treaty provision.43 Any kind of action could 
potentially qualify as practice44 so long as it is not a one-off action: some 
“element of constancy” is required.45
To be subsequent practice, a practice must be understood to relate to the 
obligations of the specific treaty. Actions related to another treaty are not 
                                                                                                                     
38 Id. art. 31, para. 3(b).
39 Id. art. 31, para. 3(c).
40 GARDINER, supra note 30, at 32.
41 Julian Davis Mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile 
to Drafting History?, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 780, 781 (2013).
42 CHRISTIAN DJEFFAL, STATIC AND EVOLUTIVE TREATY INTERPRETATION 163 (2016) 
(noting with approval that use of subsequent practice “imports legal reality” into the 
interpretation of treaties).
43 See GARDINER, supra note 30, at 254–55. By logical implication, this means that an 
action that does not comply with a treaty provision generally cannot be considered 
subsequent practice for treaty interpretation purposes. Id. at 280 (noting there is a 
“presumption that the parties [to a treaty] through their practice intend to interpret the treaty 
rather than change it”). However, where state practice relative to a treaty does not meet the 
ordinary meaning of the treaty text, and the state parties agree to the practice, it is possible
for this to become subsequent practice that amounts to an amendment of the treaty. Id. at
275–80 (noting, among only a few examples, how the practice of using a veto in the U.N. 
Security Council does not comply with the terms of the U.N. Charter but has been accepted 
by all member countries through practice as a legitimate interpretation of the Charter).
44 Id. at 254–55; see also ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (1971) (arguing that when a state’s actions do not agree with 
statements by functionaries within its government, the actions should take precedence); id.
(“[I]t is an extremely dubious proposition to rely upon the arguments of governments, 
expressed either through their attorneys or foreign offices, rather than their acts.”).
45 GARDINER, supra note 30, at 259.
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necessarily relevant even if the treaty is on a related topic.46 Therefore, it must 
be clear that the practice is undertaken in application of the treaty provisions. In 
general, the weight to be given to any subsequent practice depends on the 
“clarity and specificity” of the practice and “whether and how it is repeated.”47
A critical consideration is whose subsequent practice matters. An action 
must be done directly by, or be attributable to, a state party to have value as 
subsequent practice.48 Also, there could be many parties acting, or just one.49
Recall that subsequent practice must “establish[] the agreement of the parties.”50
In the context of a multilateral treaty, the actions of all parties must exhibit some 
measure of concordance,51 or the action of a single party must be followed by 
the “manifested or imputable” agreement of the other parties that the action 
reflects an accurate interpretation of the treaty.52 Importantly, silence or inaction 
may be interpreted as agreement, especially if an action by one party “calls for 
a reaction by another” and there is none.53 Therefore, subsequent practice does 
not require there to be “abundant practice by all parties to [a] treaty”54 so long 
as the practice of some parties is supported by “good evidence that the other 
parties have endorsed the practice.”55
It is critical to note that the VCLT specifies “[a] treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith.”56 Good faith, in this case, “indicates how the task of 
interpretation is to be undertaken.”57 The result of a good-faith interpretation 
would be an understanding of a treaty’s terms that “reflect[s] effectively the true 
intentions” of the parties.58 In other words, the interpretation reflects “the spirit 
of the treaty and not [necessarily] its mere literal meaning.”59
While not specifically defined in the VCLT, good faith can be understood 
to have three aspects. First, good faith with regard to treaties requires 
reasonableness in both interpretation and the performance of obligations.60
                                                                                                                     
46 Id. at 225–26. However, other treaties may contribute to relevant rules of 
international law applicable between the parties. Id. at 299–302.
47 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, at 122, U.N. Doc. 
A/71/10 (2016).
48 GARDINER, supra note 30, at 266; see also DJEFFAL, supra note 42, at 165 (noting 
that “Art. 31(3) VCLT does not expressly limit subsequent practice to states”).
49 GARDINER, supra note 30, at 270.
50 VCLT, supra note 29, art. 31, para. 3(b). For treaties to have binding force, “[t]he
consent of the states parties . . . is a vital factor, since states may . . . be bound only by their 
consent.” SHAW, supra note 6, at 660. 
51 GARDINER, supra note 30, at 269.
52 Id. at 267.
53 Id. at 264; see also Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 47, at 122.
54 GARDINER, supra note 30, at 270.
55 Id. 
56 VCLT, supra note 29, art. 31, para. 1.
57 GARDINER, supra note 30, at 171.
58 Id. at 172.
59 BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS 114 (1953).
60 GARDINER, supra note 30, at 176.
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Second, good faith “may demand a form of balancing of rights and obligations”
such that a party does not act arbitrarily or abuse its rights.61 One party to a 
treaty should not abuse its position or rights—even sovereign rights62—but 
rather “be fair and equitable as between the parties” and not undertake actions 
“calculated to procure . . . an unfair advantage” or “to prejudice the interests of 
the other contracting part[ies].”63 Finally, good faith requires interpreting a 
treaty so as to give effect to all its provisions rather than negating the effect of 
some provisions as a result of the interpretation of others.64 Also, good faith 
does not apply only to interpretation. Part III of the VCLT begins with the
general premise that all treaties “must be performed by [the parties] in good 
faith.”65 So, good faith is a critical element of both interpretation and 
performance of treaties, not surprising since interpretation of a treaty obligation 
is a necessary precursor to performing that obligation.66
In summary, subsequent practice is the consistent and concordant actions 
attributable to states parties to a treaty, or acquiescence to other party’s actions, 
that apply a treaty provision based on a good-faith interpretation of the treaty, 
and that demonstrate the agreement of the parties as to the provision’s meaning. 
When combined with the other elements of interpretation, subsequent practice 
helps provide a full picture of what the parties to a treaty meant by the treaty’s
provisions. With regard to the Outer Space Treaty, as discussed in Part III, 
subsequent practice actually reveals some agreement of the parties, though 
limited, regarding the interpretation of provisions relative to the ownership of 
space resources.
III. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
The Outer Space Treaty comprises the core of international space law. 
However, the vagueness of key provisions of the Treaty has led to much debate 
over the nature and extent of rights and obligations regarding space resources. 
By looking beyond the Treaty text to the subsequent practice of states parties to 
the Treaty, in accordance with the VCLT, it is possible to more clearly define 
the international rights and obligations under the Outer Space Treaty. 
Unfortunately, subsequent practice to date has not been sufficient to 
conclusively answer the extent to which private use or ownership of space 
resources is recognized under international law.
                                                                                                                     
61 Id. at 177.
62 CHENG, supra note 59, at 117, 123–29.
63 Id. at 125.
64 See GARDINER, supra note 30, at 179.
65 VCLT, supra note 29, art. 26.
66 See CHENG, supra note 59, at 115; GARDINER, supra note 30, at 172.
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A. Space Law and the Outer Space Treaty
International space law comprises a core suite of four treaties67 that work in 
partnership with one another.68 The Outer Space Treaty was the first of these 
treaties to be concluded and provides the overall framework for all of space 
law.69 Subsequent space treaties refer to and further develop issues first 
identified in the Outer Space Treaty.70 Significantly, all spacefaring countries 
are parties to the Outer Space Treaty, which has the most states parties of any 
space treaty.71
The Outer Space Treaty is a lofty document laying out the international 
community’s aspirations for outer space. In the preamble of the Treaty, the 
parties declare their belief that space exploration “should be carried on for the 
benefit of all peoples” and will “contribute to broad international co-
                                                                                                                     
67 The other “core” space treaties are the Rescue and Return Agreement, the Liability 
Convention, and the Registration Convention. See Gabrynowicz & Serrao, supra note 12, at 
228; Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Unedited Transcript of the Legal 
Subcommittee on Its 656th Meeting, at 11 (Apr. 2, 2002) [hereinafter COPUOS Transcript], 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/transcripts/legal/LEGALT_656E.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XNW-
Z2GC] (remarks by U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Brill).
68 Of course, the treaties also work in conjunction with any relevant customary 
international law and general principles of international law. 
69 The Outer Space Treaty has been referred to as the “constitution” or “Magna Carta”
of space law. Gabrynowicz & Serrao, supra note 12, at 228; Eilene Galloway, The United 
States and the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space, 40 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 18, 27 (1997);
F.G. von der Dunk, The Origins of Authorisation: Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and 
International Space Law, in NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION IN EUROPE 3, 8 (Frans G. von 
der Dunk ed., 2011).
70 The Rescue and Return Agreement is an elaboration of Article V of the Outer Space 
Treaty, the Liability Convention is an elaboration of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, 
and the Registration Convention is an elaboration of Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty. 
FABIO TRONCHETTI, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPACE LAW AND POLICY 9–13, 28–29 (Joseph N. 
Pelton ed., 2013); see also Galloway, supra note 69, at 27 (describing how “the first three 
international space agreements . . . represent extensions of articles in the” Outer Space 
Treaty).
71 Currently, there are 107 states parties to the Outer Space Treaty, including all 
spacefaring countries. Outer Space Treaty, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outer_
Space_Treaty [https://perma.cc/35SS-7EGZ] (last updated Feb. 3, 2018) (listing the states 
parties and twenty-three nonparty signatories to the Outer Space Treaty); see also Comm. on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Status of International Agreements 
Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2017, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7, at 12 (2017) (showing 105 states as parties); Press Release, 
Malta Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade Promotion, Malta Accedes to the “Outer Space 
Treaty” (May 26, 2017), https://foreignaffairs.gov.mt/en/Embassies/Hc_London/Pages/News/
Malta-accedes-to-the-%E2%80%9COuter-Space-Treaty%E2%80%9D.aspx [https://perma.cc/
823M-99AS]; Office for Outer Space Affairs, Status of International Agreements Relating to 
Activities in Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/
treaties/status/index.html [https://perma.cc/2VZS-UP97] (showing Nicaragua’s ratification of 
the Outer Space Treaty in 2017).
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operation.”72 The preamble goes on to say that “such co-operation will 
contribute to the development of mutual understanding and . . . friendly 
relations between States and peoples.”73
Although the Outer Space Treaty literally encompasses the universe, it does 
so without specific, detailed provisions or even definitions of its terms. This has 
given rise to the current debate over whether and how a private party can use or 
obtain ownership rights in space resources.
B. Outer Space Treaty and Space Resources
The basic beliefs stated in the preamble of the Outer Space Treaty form the 
backdrop for the substantive articles that articulate the broad rights of states in 
outer space and the parameters constraining the exercise of those rights. Debates 
around the right to use or own space resources focus on a few main provisions 
of the Outer Space Treaty that discuss the “use” of outer space and the “benefit”
of that use. Article I of the Treaty provides that “[o]uter space . . . shall be free 
for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind.”74
Some commentators argue that the freedom to “use” outer space, as articulated 
in this provision, must reasonably include the extraction of resources. This broad 
interpretation is based variously on specific wording,75 the overall sense of the 
treaty,76 and the general premise that “international law permits freedom of 
action for states, unless there is a rule constraining” a particular action.77
Article VI of the Treaty discusses the role of private entities in outer space. 
Activity by nongovernmental entities is allowed, but the “activities of 
non-governmental entities in outer space . . . require authorization and 
continuing supervision” by a state.78 States “bear international responsibility”
for any problems caused by nongovernmental entities because they are 
responsible for “assuring that national activities [in outer space] are carried out 
in conformity with the provisions [of the] Treaty.”79 However, states are free to 
establish their own regimes for authorization and supervision.80 This, according 
to commentators favoring a broad interpretation, taken together with the 
                                                                                                                     
72 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, at pmbl.
73 Id.
74 Id. art. I, para. 2.
75 H.L. VAN TRAA-ENGELMAN, COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION OF OUTER SPACE 20 (1993) 
(observing that “[t]he combination of the two words ‘exploration’ and ‘use’ indicates the 
possibility of a type of use being more comprehensive” than if the word “exploration” alone 
had been used).
76 Stephen E. Doyle, Using Extraterrestrial Resources Under the Moon Agreement of 
1979, 26 J. SPACE L. 111, 116 (1998) (“In its total impression, the 1967 OST is an enabling 
treaty . . . it is not restrictive.”).
77 SHAW, supra note 6, at 154.
78 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. VI.
79 Id.
80 See Galloway, supra note 24, at 315 (noting that the United States can “decide how 
to implement its international responsibility for national space activities”).
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freedom to “use” outer space established in Article I, demonstrates that the 
Outer Space Treaty specifically allows private (nongovernmental) entities to 
extract space resources (use outer space) for commercial purposes81 so long as 
they are regulated (authorized and supervised) by a state.
Other commentators argue that the “use” of outer space permitted in 
Article I is more limited. They base their narrower interpretation on the 
prohibition against “national appropriation”82 of outer space, a critical limitation 
on the rights of states parties, found in Article II. The argument is that this 
prohibition in Article II completely bars a country from recognizing ownership 
of space resources.83 Others argue that even if ownership in space resources 
could be recognized without implicating claims of sovereignty, outer space must 
be used for the “benefit and in the interests of all countries” because it is the 
“province of all mankind.”84
Some commentators have argued that, although the Outer Space Treaty uses 
the concept “province of all mankind,” outer space should actually be 
understood to be the “common heritage of mankind,”85 which means that “all 
humanity has the right to share in the benefits of [commercial use].”86 Such an 
understanding would prevent any one entity from legally owning space 
resources without some agreed sharing of benefits. Most commentators, 
however, stress a distinction between the two concepts noting that province
refers to a “nonexclusive right to use and explore space,” whereas heritage
refers to the “potential extraction of resources, and resource allocation.”87 This
majority viewpoint avoids applying the “common heritage” standard to space 
resources under the Outer Space Treaty. Regardless of the standard, the 
argument is that no party, whether governmental or nongovernmental, can 
extract resources solely for its own benefit.
                                                                                                                     
81 VAN TRAA-ENGELMAN, supra note 75, at 22 (asserting that allowing “space activities 
by the private sector automatically introduce[s] the commercial aspect”).
82 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. II.
83 The argument is that the very recognition of ownership is a national appropriation by 
exercise of sovereignty and, therefore, is prohibited by the Treaty. Fabio Tronchetti, Title
IV—Space Resource Exploration and Utilization of the US Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act: A Legal and Political Assessment, 41 AIR & SPACE L. 143, 145–46
(2016); cf. BIN CHENG, The 1967 Space Treaty, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
215, 234 (1997) (recounting suggestions that even if sovereignty is not implicated, “the semi-
permanent occupation of . . . celestial bodies for purposes of exploitation will pose 
problems”).
84 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. I, para. 1.
85 Aldo Armando Cocca, Prospective Space Law, 26 J. SPACE L. 51, 53 (1998).
86 BIN CHENG, The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary 
Problem; Functionalism Versus Spatialism: The Major Premises, in STUDIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 425, 436 (1997) (describing the common-heritage-of-mankind 
concept as “convey[ing] the idea that the management, exploitation and distribution of the 
natural resources of [an] area . . . are matters to be decided by the international 
community . . . and are not to be left to the initiative and discretion of individual States or 
their nationals”); Cocca, supra note 85, at 53.
87 E.g., Gabrynowicz & Serrao, supra note 12, at 229.
188 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:1
When drafting the Outer Space Treaty, delegates to the Legal Subcommittee 
of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) were 
aware of the potential contradiction created by the terms of the treaty, which 
both guarantee use of outer space but prohibit its appropriation.88 Nevertheless, 
the final text of the Outer Space Treaty lacks definitions for its terms and retains 
the apparent contradiction (so textual arguments about the status of space 
resources are bound to be inconclusive). At one point, parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty negotiated a subsequent agreement to clarify the issue of space resources: 
the Moon Agreement.89 However, this agreement has attracted only minimal 
support90 and has failed to garner the signature or ratification of the major 
spacefaring countries, including the United States.91
Since the ordinary meaning of the Outer Space Treaty’s terms creates 
ambiguity, and no subsequent agreement that clarifies the meaning of the terms 
as they pertain to space resources is in force between most of the parties, the 
interpretative requirements of Article 31 of the VCLT indicate that subsequent 
practice takes on great significance in interpreting the meaning of these treaty 
rights and obligations.92 While there had not been a broad array of subsequent 
practice in the use of space resources prior to the passage of the Space Resource 
Act, there had been enough to suggest some clarification for the meaning of the 
terms “use” and “benefit” in the Outer Space Treaty. 
1. “Use” of Space Resources
Space resources have been in use for many years. Perhaps the most famous 
are the lunar samples (Moon rocks) obtained by the United States and Soviet 
Union during the heyday of lunar exploration after the Outer Space Treaty came 
into force in 1967.93 More recently, Japan collected materials from an asteroid 
                                                                                                                     
88 French delegate Mr. Seydoux questioned “how far the principle of non-appropriation 
was compatible with effective exploration and exploitation.” Comm. on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space, Summary Rec. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its 57th Meeting, at 16, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.57 (Oct. 20, 1966).
89 Moon Agreement, supra note 8, at pmbl.
90 This lack of support likely results from the significant controversy that surrounded 
the provisions related to space resources. Seven years, from 1972–1979, were spent 
negotiating language related to the “disposition of the potential benefits resulting from the 
exploitation and use of [space] resources.” CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 348 (1982). As late as 1978, the issue of a benefit-
sharing regime “seemed almost insurmountable.” Id. at 356.
91 See supra note 11.
92 See supra Part II.
93 The U.S. Apollo missions returned from the Moon with a total of 842 pounds of lunar 
material between 1969 and 1972. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., NASA’S MANAGEMENT OF MOON ROCKS AND OTHER ASTROMATERIALS 
LOANED FOR RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PUBLIC DISPLAY, REPORT NO. IG-12-007, at 1
(2011). 
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during its Hayabusa mission launched in 2003.94 In the United States, the Moon 
rocks have been used for scientific research, and for goodwill and education 
purposes.95 Importantly, the U.S. government has consistently asserted its 
ownership over the Moon rocks.96 In 1973, the U.S. government also made a 
gift of a Moon rock to every U.S. state and various countries as a gesture of 
friendship.97 In cases when these Moon rocks have been lost or stolen, the 
United States has successfully demanded their return claiming them to be 
government property.98 Other countries have not opposed these claims.99 In 
addition, other countries are continuing to visit the Moon to obtain their own 
lunar samples.100 This ongoing practice by some countries and apparent 
acceptance of the practice by others would suggest agreement among states that 
governments can own mineral resources extracted from a celestial body, 
especially if used for scientific, goodwill, or educational purposes.101
                                                                                                                     
94 Id. at 2.
95 Id. at 4–7.
96 See id. at 2 (“NASA’s collection of astromaterials is the property of the U.S. 
Government . . . .”).
97 These rocks were fragments of a rock collected on the last Apollo mission named the 
Goodwill Moon Rock. Id. at 7.
98 MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN, THE LITTLE BOOK OF SPACE LAW 158–60 (2013). In one case, 
a federal judge recognized a stolen fragment of the Goodwill Moon Rock as being “national 
property” of Honduras after the United States, being the original owner of the rock, made a 
gift of it in 1973. United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material, 252 
F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
99 See Tronchetti, supra note 83, at 146. Recall that failure to act can be considered 
subsequent practice where an action would be expected. See supra note 53.
100 China’s lunar program began in 2007, and its first mission to return lunar samples, 
called “Chang’e-5,” is currently scheduled for launch in 2019 after being postponed due to 
a launch failure in 2017. China Expects To Launch Fifth Lunar Probe Chang’e-5 in 2017,
CHINA NAT’L SPACE ADMIN. (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6443408/n6465719/c64
78841/content.html [https://perma.cc/KZ7B-DNRV]; Jeff Foust, Long March 5 Failure To
Postpone China’s Lunar Exploration Program, SPACENEWS (Sept. 25, 2017), 
http://spacenews.com/long-march-5-failure-to-postpone-chinas-lunar-exploration-program/ 
[https://perma.cc/69Z5-R6SU]; David R. Williams, Future Chinese Lunar Missions, NASA,
https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/cnsa_moon_future.html [https://perma.cc/K33Z-9H4A]
(last updated Oct. 3, 2017). Ultimately, China’s lunar exploration plans include mining of 
lunar resources. Vikram Mansharamani, China Wants To Mine the Moon for ‘Space Gold,’
PBS (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/china-wants-to-mine-the-
moon-for-space-gold [https://perma.cc/V82M-XAU3].
101 In fact, based on the One Lucite Ball case, it would seem that each of the countries 
that received a fragment of the Goodwill Moon Rock could also claim ownership of lunar 
material. This includes 86 of the 107 current states parties to the Outer Space Treaty (not to 
mention 22 of the nonparty signatory states). If these countries do, in fact, claim ownership, 
this very widespread and concordant conduct becomes an excellent example of subsequent 
practice. (The total number of eighty-six was determined by comparing Where Today Are 
the Apollo 17 Goodwill Moon Rocks?, COLLECTSPACE, http://www.collectspace.com/resource
s/moonrocks_goodwill.html [https://perma.cc/ZRX8-YXT3] (listing the 135 countries that 
received a Goodwill Moon Rock fragment) with WIKIPEDIA, supra note 71 (listing the 107 
current states parties and 23 nonparty signatories to the Outer Space Treaty)).
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Another example of a space resource, the use of which is both more 
prevalent and more important for everyday life, is the use of Earth orbit for 
satellites. Since the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957,102 Earth orbit has been filled 
with thousands of launched objects103 including 1,738 currently operating 
satellites.104 Earth orbit, especially geostationary orbit (GSO), is a limited and 
valuable commodity.105 GSO is in such high demand that the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU)106 was assigned the responsibility of 
managing the assignment of orbital slots in order to avoid interference between 
satellites107 and to ensure an equitable means of providing GSO access for all 
countries.108 Significantly, orbital slots are used both by governments and 
private entities and are used for both public and commercial purposes.109 The 
many years of using this system to assign orbital slots demonstrates, in spite of 
some controversy,110 broad international agreement that this space resource can 
be used by private entities, and can be used for commercial purposes. 
2. “Benefit” of Using Space Resources
Some subsequent practice relates directly to the obligation to share benefits 
from the use of space resources. The failure of most states to sign or ratify the 
Moon Agreement after nearly forty years appears to be a rejection of its 
proposed international regime to organize the sharing of benefits from space 
resources.111 Nevertheless, most countries recognize an obligation to share 
                                                                                                                     
102 KLEIMAN, supra note 98, at vii–viii.
103 At present there are over 8,000 space objects registered with the United Nations. 
Office for Outer Space Affairs, Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/search-ng.jspx?lf_id= [https://perma.cc/CN5L-
W6EG].
104 UCS Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/
nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.WKiMVBIrKRs [https://perma.cc/NM2
K-GSWE] (last updated Nov. 7, 2017).
105 KLEIMAN, supra note 98, at 61. GSO is limited because it can only be attained above 
the equator at a specific altitude of approximately 22,300 miles. SHAW, supra note 6, at 399. 
It is valuable because it “is the only orbit capable of providing continuous contact with 
ground stations via a single satellite.” Id.
106 The ITU was first established in 1865 to manage international telegraph networks, 
and its mandate has since expanded to include all manner of communication technologies. 
Discover ITU’s History, ITU, http://handle.itu.int/11.1004/020.2000/s.031 [https://perma.cc/
R9AK-SSRT].
107 KLEIMAN, supra note 98, at 61.
108 Id. at 64.
109 Id. at 59–60 (“The operation of private telecommunications satellites is, by far, the 
most successful, widespread, and profitable commercial use of outer space to date.”).
110 Id. at 62–68.
111 Christopher D. Johnson, Reality and Clarity in Understanding the Prohibition on 
National Appropriation in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 9 at n.* (66th International 
Astronautical Congress, Paper No. IAC-15-D4.3.13, 2015), https://swfound.org/media/205288
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benefits from the use of space resources and many countries with active space 
programs claim that they satisfy that obligation by directly involving other 
countries in space activities or sharing information and knowledge derived from 
space activities with other countries. 
Thirty years after concluding the Outer Space Treaty, states parties 
reiterated and further described the obligation for sharing benefits obtained from 
outer space by agreeing to the U.N. Space Benefit Declaration.112 This 
Declaration, adopted unanimously by resolution of the U.N. General 
Assembly,113 was specifically intended to “facilitat[e] the application of the 
principle that the exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be carried out for 
the benefit and in the interest of all countries.”114 The resolution calls on “[a]ll 
States, particularly those with relevant space capabilities and with programmes 
for the exploration and use of outer space . . . to promot[e] and foster[]
international cooperation [giving] particular attention . . . to the benefit and the 
interests of developing countries and countries with incipient space 
programmes.”115 However, there are no specific rules laid down to determine 
the nature of these benefits. Rather, the resolution provides a flexible 
arrangement giving states the “free[dom] to determine all aspects of their 
participation in international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer 
space” provided that participation is “on an equitable and mutually acceptable 
basis” and “[c]ontractual terms [are] fair and reasonable.”116
Although the Declaration, as a U.N. resolution, is not binding per se, its 
terms are subsequent practice among the states parties to the Outer Space Treaty, 
and may be binding to the extent that they further express existing treaty 
obligations.117 Several countries with active space programs have actually 
                                                                                                                     
/reality-and-clarity-in-understanding-the-prohibition-on-national.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3LE-
LKHZ].
112 G.A. Res. 51/122, Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular 
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, at 1–2 (Feb. 4, 1997).
113 Office for Outer Space Affairs, A/RES/51/122, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.unoosa.
org/oosa/oosadoc/data/resolutions/1996/general_assembly_51st_session/ares51122.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7RX-57ZE].
114 G.A. Res. 51/122, supra note 112, at 2.
115 Id. at annex, para. 3.
116 Id. at annex, para. 2. 
117 Even without an existing treaty, the provisions of a U.N. resolution may become rules 
of international law to the extent that states agree with and conform to them. See BIN CHENG,
Outer Space: The International Legal Framework—the International Legal Status of Outer 
Space, Space Objects, and Spacemen, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 383, 391–
92 (1997); SHAW, supra note 6, at 394. This evolution from U.N. resolution provision to rule 
of international law, if it occurs, can happen quickly. In 1965, Bin Cheng controversially 
suggested that due to the rapid agreement on U.N. resolutions on space law in the 1960s 
those resolutions may have represented “instant customary international law.” BIN CHENG,
The United Nations and the Development of International Law Relating to Outer Space, in
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 150, 192 (1997). However, his use of the term 
“instant” was intended merely to indicate the rapidity of the development and not that the 
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linked their specific efforts to share benefits of using space to the Space Benefit 
Declaration.118 For example, Austria participates in European Space Agency 
“cooperation projects that especially benefit developing countries,”119 and 
provides “special support”120 for individuals from developing countries to 
participate in education and training in space-related fields. France reports that 
it uses its cooperation agreements with developing countries to “foster[] the 
development of relevant and appropriate space capabilities.”121 In 2014, the 
United Kingdom created the “Newton Fund” in order to “promote the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries” that currently has an annual 
allocation of £75 million.122
The United States has also publicly identified how it responds to the 
obligation to share benefits. In remarks before the Legal Subcommittee of 
COPUOS, the United States affirmed its support of the principle that the use of 
outer space benefit “all peoples” and asserted that the United States “remains 
highly engaged in activities that benefit non-space-faring nations.”123 The 
United States specifically cited the sharing of weather and GPS data “free of 
direct user fees” and the sharing of space and Earth science data “with the world 
scientific community” at little or no cost as responsive to this principle.124
                                                                                                                     
General Assembly resolutions were legally binding. Id. at 192–93, 197 (explaining that, 
depending on the circumstances, “the time factor is not of crucial importance” in the 
formation of rules of international law, but that nevertheless “[r]ules of international law are 
binding because States consider[] themselves bound by them”); Birgit Haugk et al., The 
Contribution of the United Nations to the Further Development of International Law—Using 
the Example of Outer Space Law, 2 SRI LANKA J. INT’L L. 89, 95 (1990) (describing the 
notion of “instant customary law” as “replac[ing] long-term practice by ‘intensity of 
practice’”).
118 These countries include Australia, Austria, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Compendium: Mechanisms Adopted by States 
and International Organizations in Relation to Non-Legally Binding United Nations 
Instruments on Outer Space 2 (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw
/Non_legallyb_mech/COMPENDIUM_Updated_31_March_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2WD-
9PG3] (updating U.N. DOC. A/AC.105/C.2/2016 (Apr. 11, 2016)).
119 Id. at 9.
120 Id. at 10.
121 Id. at 26 (“[The agreements typically include:] Exchange of information and 
data . . . ; [t]raining of experts, including scientists and students; [e]xchange of personnel; 
[o]rganization of joint workshops, seminars and symposiums; [p]romotion of space activities 
towards the youth.”).
122 Id. at 60.
123 COPUOS Transcript, supra note 67, at 11. NASA has been actively involved in 
working with developing countries. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., RELEASE NO.
11-123, NASA AND USAID PLEDGE TO ADVANCE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WITH 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 25, 2011), https://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2011/apr/HQ
_11-123_NASA_USAID.html [https://perma.cc/YAB3-2LNY]; NAT’L AERONATUICS & SPACE 
ADMIN., RELEASE NO. 10-244, NASA HOSTS SYMPOSIUM ABOUT LATIN AMERICAN SPACE 
PARTNERSHIPS (Sept. 16, 2010), https://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2010/sep/10-224_Latin_
American_Symposium.html [https://perma.cc/Y5UB-JFTT]. 
124 COPUOS Transcript, supra note 67, at 12.
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Taken together, the subsequent practice of states parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty regarding the sharing of benefits from the use of outer space reinforces 
the Treaty obligation to share benefits with other countries. However, according 
to the spacefaring countries, this obligation is tempered by the right of a state 
using a space resource to determine how to define and distribute the benefit. 
This tension between a broadly accepted obligation to share and an individual 
state’s right to determine how and what to share makes for a weak obligation 
and reflects the same lack of consensus around space resources that undoubtedly 
has kept the Moon Agreement from attaining broad acceptance.
3. Sovereignty over Space Resources
A critical limit on the rights of states in outer space is the prohibition on 
national appropriation, including by claim of sovereignty.125 This limit has been 
consistently followed by the international community, including the United 
States even when it has claimed ownership of a space resource. For example, 
the U.S. government planted flags on the Moon and claims ownership of the 
lunar material it collected.126 Nevertheless, the United States does not claim to 
have appropriated lunar territory. As one commentator described it, the act of 
planting flags on the Moon by U.S. astronauts “signified a national achievement, 
not the acquisition of territory.”127 Even the Space Resource Act itself declares 
that “the United States does not . . . assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive 
rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body,”128 while at 
the same time recognizing private ownership of space resources.
In the case of orbital resources, there was an attempt in 1976 by a group of 
equatorial nations to extend their sovereignty beyond airspace into Earth orbit 
claiming that geostationary orbit constituted a natural resource of their subjacent 
countries.129 The international community rejected this claim.130 More recently, 
the United States and other countries partnering to establish the International 
Space Station went out of their way in the cooperation agreement to declare that 
no portion of the space station or its use “constitut[ed] a basis for asserting a 
                                                                                                                     
125 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. II.
126 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 93, at 2.
127 Gabrynowicz & Serrao, supra note 12, at 230; see also Simpson, supra note 12, at 
179.
128 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, § 403, 
129 Stat. 704, 722 (2015). Noted space law commentator Fabio Tronchetti considered it 
“highly significant that the U.S. . . . decided to emphasize this point.” Tronchetti, supra note 
83, at 149.
129 The Bogotá Declaration, WORDPRESS, https://bogotadeclaration.wordpress.com/declara
tion-of-1976/ [https://perma.cc/M6HF-LT2S]; see also D. Goedhuis, Influence of the Conquest 
of Outer Space on National Sovereignty: Some Observations, 6 J. SPACE L. 37, 38–39 (1978).
130 KLEIMAN, supra note 98, at 63–64; SHAW, supra note 6, at 399. Interestingly, there 
has never been a firm delimitation made as to where airspace (with sovereignty) ends and 
outer space (without sovereignty) begins. SHAW, supra note 6, at 393; Goedhuis, supra note 
129, at 40.
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claim to national appropriation over outer space or over any portion of outer 
space” by any of the signatory countries.131
This repeated and concordant conduct by states, spread over several 
decades, constitutes subsequent practice by states parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty establishing agreement that the use or claim of ownership of a space 
resource by a country does not constitute a territorial claim or national 
appropriation of outer space, even if the exercise of sovereignty is necessary to 
establish or protect the use or claim of ownership.
C. Space Resources and the Results of Subsequent Practice 
When viewed together, the subsequent practice of states before the United 
States passed the Space Resource Act suggests general agreement as to certain 
limited aspects of the rights and obligations pertaining to space resources 
contained in the Outer Space Treaty. The areas of agreement can be summarized 
as follows:
1. Mineral space resources extracted from celestial bodies can be owned by 
governmental entities and used for scientific, goodwill, or educational 
purposes.132
2. Orbital space resources can be used by both governments and private 
entities for commercial purposes.
3. When using space resources there is an obligation to provide some benefit 
to other countries, but this is flexible and to be decided by the space 
resource user.
4. Space resources can be used or owned without national appropriation of 
the portion of outer space or the celestial body where the resource is 
located.133
It is interesting to note that while both orbital slots and Moon rocks qualify 
as space resources and fall under the auspices of the Outer Space Treaty they 
have been treated differently in practice. This difference is not surprising, 
however, considering their different characteristics. While both are limited 
resources, they are limited in fundamentally different ways. Orbital resources 
are limited in terms of how many parties can use a particular orbit at once, but 
this type of resource is inexhaustible. No matter how much an orbit is used, it 
will never be used up. Once an orbital slot is no longer used by one user, the 
next user will receive a fully utilizable, undiminished resource. On the other 
hand, mineral resources on the Moon are exhaustible just as they are on Earth. 
                                                                                                                     
131 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station art. 2, 
para. 2(c), Jan. 29, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12927. State parties to the agreement are Canada, 
Japan, Russia, the United States, and the European Space Agency member governments 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Id. at pmbl.
132 Tronchetti, supra note 83, at 146.
133 See Galloway, supra note 24, at 312.
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If one user extracts mineral resources, later users of the Moon will not be able 
to use those same resources. Once extracted, the resource is gone forever. 
This difference in resource type may explain the difference in how the 
international community has treated space resources: accepting private,
commercial use of orbital resources (inexhaustible resources) but accepting only 
governmental use or ownership of mineral resources (exhaustible resources) for 
certain purposes. It is logical that questions of equity and fairness will be most 
keenly at issue where a resource is subject to depletion as opposed to one that 
can be used repeatedly without any depletion. As a result, it is clear that there is 
no agreement at present, among the parties to the Outer Space Treaty, that a 
private entity can use or own exhaustible space resources for commercial 
purposes.134
IV. THE SPACE RESOURCE ACT
The Space Resource Act is a brief statute135 that purports to recognize 
private ownership of space resources.136 The Act says a U.S. citizen can 
“possess, own, transport, use, and sell [an] asteroid resource or space 
resource.”137 However, the rights are only recognized if the resource is 
“obtained in accordance with . . . the international obligations of the United 
States.”138 What are the international obligations applicable to these rights? 
A. Compliance with the Outer Space Treaty
There is widespread agreement that the Outer Space Treaty is the primary 
international obligation at issue here. Congressional consideration of the law 
                                                                                                                     
134 JOHNSON, supra note 111, at 9. There also appears to be no agreement that 
governments can use exhaustible space resources for commercial purposes. But see Douglas 
Martin, Space Artifacts of Soviets Soar at a $7 Million Auction, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/12/nyregion/space-artifacts-of-soviets-soar-at-a-7-million-auctio
n.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (reporting that the Russian government sold 
three moon rocks at auction (presumably to private buyers) for $442,500).
135 Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 
§§ 401–403, 129 Stat. 704, 720–22 (2015) (to be codified at 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303).
The Space Resource Act takes up less than two pages of the larger U.S. Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act. Id.
136 The full text of the Space Resource Act provision related to space resource rights 
reads as follows:
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or 
a space resource under this chapter shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space 
resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid 
resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the 
international obligations of the United States.
Id. § 403 (to be codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51303).
137 Id.
138 Id. (emphasis added).
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made specific reference to the Treaty,139 and commentators refer to this Treaty 
when discussing the law in the context of space resources.140 Even industry 
advocates who support the law do not dispute that the Outer Space Treaty 
applies.141 In fact, in a presentation to the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS, a 
representative of U.S. private sector space interests made the point 
unequivocally: “[W]e in the private sector worked diligently with our colleagues 
on Capitol Hill to ensure that the [Space Resource Act] complied with and 
supported the Outer Space Treaty.”142
In spite of this agreement, there are differences of opinion as to whether the 
Space Resource Act violates the Outer Space Treaty. Some claim a potential 
violation of the Outer Space Treaty based on the Treaty’s requirement that all 
countries must benefit from the use of outer space, or because the prohibition 
on claims of sovereignty on celestial bodies means that domestic law cannot 
recognize property rights in space resources obtained from asteroids or the 
Moon.143 Others, especially industry advocates, claim the Act does not violate 
the Outer Space Treaty because the Treaty contains no specific prohibition on 
ownership of space resources144 and leaves it to each state party to determine
how to share the benefits of space resources.145 There are also arguments that 
                                                                                                                     
139 161 CONG. REC. H8196 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2015) (statement of Rep. Posey). It is also 
worth noting that the title of the Act uses the phrase “Exploration and Utilization,” which 
mirrors the phrasing (“exploration and use”) used in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.
140 See, e.g., Position Paper on Space Resource Mining, INT’L INST. SPACE L. 3 (Dec.
20, 2015), http://iislwebo.wwwnlss1.a2hosted.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/SpaceResource
Mining.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DUK-JMCJ] (discussing the Space Resource Act and 
international space law).
141 E.g., BUS. L. BASICS, supra note 19; Sagi Kfir, Is Asteroid Mining Legal?, DEEP 
SPACE INDUSTRIES, http://deepspaceindustries.com/is-asteroid-mining-legal/ [https://perma.cc/
HR9T-ZNFG].
142 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal Subcommittee, 56th Session,
U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., at 143:01 (Mar. 29, 2017) (technical presentation by Mike 
Gold, Chair, Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC)), 
https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/oosa/speakerslog/c621aa64-f029-44d5-8456-d28
75fa0d4cd (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) [hereinafter COPUOS Mar. 29]. 
COMSTAC is the official advisory committee to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation. See Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation: Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC), FED.
AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/advisory
_committee/ [https://perma.cc/89SJ-YU92].
143 Tronchetti, supra note 83, at 145–46.
144 See, e.g., Kfir, supra note 141; Frans von der Dunk, The US Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act of 2015, JURIST (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2015/11/
frans-vonderdunk-space-launch.php [https://perma.cc/8Q53-TJJH].
145 Galloway, supra note 69, at 26 (recounting the U.S. Senate’s understanding “that 
nothing in article I, paragraph 1 of the [Outer Space Treaty] diminishes or alters the rights 
of the United States to determine how it shares the benefits and results of its space 
activities”). For purposes of U.S. law, it is also important to understand if the Treaty is self-
executing. In general, a treaty is considered to be self-executing if it can “be enforced in the 
courts without prior legislation by Congress, and [is] non-self-executing . . . [if it can]not be 
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some asteroids, due to their small size, should not even be considered “celestial 
bodies” thereby allowing them to be claimed as a resource in their entirety.146
While both sides have valid points, the best interpretation is likely 
somewhere in between. Detractors of the Space Resource Act properly assert 
that the Outer Space Treaty clearly prohibits countries from appropriating outer 
space,147 and their argument that recognition of property rights amounts to 
appropriation by exercise of sovereignty is compelling. However, the 
subsequent practice described in Part III shows that countries have accepted that 
governments may claim ownership of Moon rocks148 while not appropriating 
the Moon itself. If this is the case, then countries are willing to accept a 
distinction between recognizing ownership of extracted space resources and 
national appropriation of the territory that produced the resources.149 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                     
enforced in the courts without prior legislative ‘implementation.’” Carlos Manuel Vázquez, 
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 695 (1995). Although 
this issue has not been adjudicated in U.S. courts with regard to the Outer Space Treaty 
specifically, portions of the Treaty could be considered self-executing because they do not 
require any legislative action. For example, the freedom to explore outer space requires no 
implementation by the government and therefore is automatically enforceable. Other 
elements, such as the ability of nongovernmental parties to conduct activities in outer space, 
require authorization by the government and would, therefore, be non-self-executing. 
Meredith Blasingame, Comment, Nurturing the United States Commercial Space Industry 
in an International World: Conflicting State, Federal, and International Law, 80 MISS. L.J.
741, 775 (2010). But see Tronchetti, supra note 83, at 149. This means that obligations in 
non-self-executing provisions of the Treaty can be met in many ways based on the particular 
needs and interests of the state. See Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited: 
“International Responsibility”, “National Activities”, and “the Appropriate State,” 26 J.
SPACE L. 7, 14 (1998) (noting, for example, that where multiple states may have a 
responsibility to authorize an activity, “it is possible [for them] to arrange for one of them to 
carry out this function”).
146 See BUS. L. BASICS, supra note 19.
147 See Trevor Bach, Obama’s New Push To Mine Outer Space Could Spark a Disaster,
Miami Professor Warns, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/
news/obamas-new-push-to-mine-outer-spacecould-spark-a-disaster-miami-professor-warns-81053
84 [https://perma.cc/DF5E-B37N].
148 One might debate whether it is ownership or mere use of Moon rocks that is generally 
recognized. However, using the United States as an example, the United States’ generally 
accepted “use” of Moon rocks seems indistinguishable from ownership because of the way 
it exercises exclusive control over them. As two space lawyers put it: “Under any definition 
of ownership, the United States clearly owns the Apollo lunar samples. Any entity that can 
claim something as an exclusive resource, control its transport and distribution, and can 
exchange it for something else of value (in this case, other lunar samples), clearly owns that 
object.” Berin Szoka & James Dunstan, Space Law: Is Asteroid Mining Legal?, WIRED (May 
1, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/05/opinion-asteroid-mining/ [https://perma.cc/K3BQ-
7KMF].
149 Numerous commentators support this distinction. E.g., Doyle, supra note 76, at 114 
(arguing that “[t]he inability to declare sovereignty is no constraint upon use”); Johnson, 
supra note 111, at 4 (arguing that “[t]here is a significant distance between a national 
government extending its territory onto large celestial planets [and] missions which extract 
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this is a logical result where states parties are attempting to implement a Treaty 
that contains an apparent contradiction between the simultaneously applicable 
right to use outer space and the prohibition against national appropriation of 
outer space.
Supporters of the law are correct in asserting that there is no specific 
prohibition on space resource ownership in the Outer Space Treaty.150 Also, the 
fact that the Moon Agreement did propose such a prohibition151 and then was 
not accepted by most countries152 is a compelling argument that countries have 
rejected the idea of a prohibition. However, just because countries did not agree 
to a prohibition does not mean that private ownership of space resources was 
accepted. Even though most countries did not ratify the treaty, it was adopted 
by consensus of all members of the United Nations.153 Plus, the repeated 
statement of the need for the use of outer space to benefit all countries that 
appears in the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Moon Agreement (1979), and the 
Space Resource Declaration (1997) militates against a categorical assertion that 
international law currently supports private space resource ownership. 
In addition, U.S. legal precedent on the matter also urges caution. In a rare 
U.S. court case applying the Outer Space Treaty to the question of private 
property interests, a federal district court determined that the Treaty itself did 
not “create[] any rights in [the Plaintiff, a private individual] to appropriate 
private property rights on asteroids.”154 While not foreclosing the possibility of 
private property rights in space resources, this case establishes that, as far as 
U.S. law is concerned, the Treaty created no inherent right to private property 
in space. This implies that under the Outer Space Treaty, private ownership of 
                                                                                                                     
resources from asteroids for scientific and commercial purposes, especially if those missions 
are [conducted] in the spirit of space activities which the Outer Space Treaty contemplates”).
150 Tronchetti, supra note 83, at 146.
151 Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11, para. 3 (“Neither the surface nor the 
subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become 
property of any State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, 
national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”) This prohibition 
was only to last until a proposed international regime “to govern the exploitation of the 
natural resources of the moon” was established. Id. art. 11, para. 5.
152 See Simpson, supra note 12, at 181 (noting, in 2014, the difficulty of advocating the 
effectiveness of the Moon Agreement “when most of the world’s countries have not accepted 
an opportunity to endorse it in the nearly thirty-five years since [it] was first open for 
signature”); supra note 11.
153 The text of the Moon Agreement was adopted by unanimous consent as General 
Assembly Resolution 34/68. See Voting Record Search: A/RES/34/68, UNITED NATIONS 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFO. SYS., http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=14874864908T
H.11201&profile=voting&uri=full=3100023~!856627~!1&ri=1&aspect=power&menu=search&s
ource=~!horizon [https://perma.cc/5QZY-M48N].
154 Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042, at *2 
(D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004), aff’d, 126 Fed. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005). This determination was 
made notwithstanding the “failure [of] the United States to ratify the [Moon Agreement].”
Id.
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space resources requires recognition by a state, which the Space Resource Act 
purports to do.
Unfortunately, this debate just demonstrates the lack of certainty about the 
nature of space resource rights and obligations under international law. And 
since the international obligations with regard to space resources are not well 
defined, the language of the Space Resource Act simply imports the unclear 
legal status of such resources into domestic law.155
B. Promoting Subsequent Practice
In addition to being part of U.S. domestic law, the Space Resource Act is 
potentially part of the United States’ own subsequent practice relative to the 
Outer Space Treaty. This makes the Space Resource Act a tool the United States
can use to influence international law by encouraging sustained, concordant 
conduct by other countries.156 So far, however, there have been mixed reactions 
to the U.S. law.
Soon after passage of the U.S. Space Resource Act, Luxembourg 
announced plans, in line with the U.S. action, to create a “formal legal 
framework which ensures that private operators working in space can be 
confident about their rights to the resources they extract.”157 Luxembourg 
subsequently finalized a new law, which begins with the following declaration: 
“Space resources are capable of being appropriated.”158 This is potentially an 
even broader recognition of ownership rights than in the United States because, 
unlike the Space Resources Act, it does not limit recognition of the 
appropriation to citizens of Luxembourg.
While the Luxembourg action is concordant with the U.S. approach to space 
resources, other countries have expressed clear reservations about the approach 
                                                                                                                     
155 See von der Dunk, supra note 69, at 14 (describing how, due to lack of an 
authoritative interpretation of obligations within the Outer Space Treaty, “uncertainties 
existing on the international level [may] be transposed also to the national level, causing 
legal uncertainty with any prospective private entity interested in undertaking space 
activities”).
156 See id. (“[U]ltimately it is up to the states concerned to create the state practice and 
opinio juris which could lead to authoritative interpretations [of Outer Space Treaty 
obligations].”); Position Paper on Space Resource Mining, supra note 140 (arguing that the 
Space Resource Act can be a “starting point for the development of international rules”).
157 Initiative, SPACERESOURCES.LU, http://www.spaceresources.public.lu/en/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/LCF9-EBDX].
158 Draft Law on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources, SPACERESOURCES.LU,
art. 1 (2017), http://www.spaceresources.public.lu/content/dam/spaceresources/news/Translation
%20Of%20The%20Draft%20Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/F476-3RSM] (Lux.) (translating 
Luxembourg law). The authoritative version of this provision in French is the same: “Les 
ressources de l’espace sont susceptibles d’appropriation.” Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur 
l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace [Law 674 of July 20, 2017 on the 
Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE 
LUXEMBOURG, July 28, 2017, art. 1, http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo 
[https://perma.cc/6XX4-KCCE].
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taken by the United States and Luxembourg. During the meeting of the Legal 
Subcommittee of COPUOS in March and April 2017, several countries 
expressed concern about possible “gaps or contradictions in the [international] 
legal framework” if the ability to exploit space resources is determined by 
national laws.159 Others were concerned about the sharing of benefits160 and the 
possibility of international conflict around space resources161 unless the issue 
was resolved through international mechanisms. There was also disagreement 
among participants regarding the role of private commercial entities in the use 
of space resources.162
It is worth noting that the United States specifically recognized the lack of 
agreement on the issue of space resources when its representative said, “Our 
own national view is that the legal issue [of space resources] is relatively 
straightforward, but that’s obviously not shared by everyone, . . . and we do 
think that we should continue to discuss this.”163 However, while recognizing 
                                                                                                                     
159 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal Subcommittee, 56th Session,
U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., at 89:33 (Mar. 28, 2017), https://icms.unov.org/Carbon
Web/public/oosa/speakerslog/ecdbee63-c7d8-4267-a070-34155faed934 (on file with Ohio 
State Law Journal) [hereinafter COPUOS Mar. 28] (remarks by delegate from Costa Rica 
on behalf of the G77 and China).
160 Id. at 90:25 (remarks by delegate from Costa Rica) (“The G77 and China considers 
that, besides the need for a broad debate about the implications of these activities, the 
developing countries shall not be excluded from the benefits of space exploration and their 
rights should be considered in the discussion.”); COPUOS Mar. 29, supra note 142, at 69:26
(remarks by delegate from Chile, simultaneous translation in English) (“[T]his specific 
subject—space mining—should only be in the interest of all countries; and that implicitly 
and clearly means that this would be something carried out on an equal footing.”); COPUOS 
Mar. 29, supra note 142, at 79:13 (remarks by delegate from Morocco, simultaneous 
translation in English) (“[W]e think that an international legal model on the exploitation and 
use of space resources could be envisaged because this would enable us, in particular, to 
[better guarantee] the interests of developing countries and other guarantees as well relating 
to the fundamental principles of space.”).
161 COPUOS Mar. 29, supra note 142, at 59:23 (remarks by delegate from Brazil) 
(“Brazil expresses its concern with the view that this matter can be effectively regulated by 
means of individual, unilateral, domestic initiatives that aim to regulate commercial activities 
in outer space. If this trend is confirmed, we are likely to see the development of multiple, 
incompatible frameworks, a situation that is prone to lead to conflict and that may eventually 
affect the sustainability of outer space.”).
162 Compare COPUOS Mar. 28, supra note 159, at 95:11 (remarks by delegate from 
China, simultaneous translation in English) (“China believes that, based on . . . the Outer 
Space Treaty, countries, including private entities that are approved and supervised by these 
countries, have the right to conduct activities in exploration and utilization of outer space 
and the use of space resources.”), with COPUOS Mar. 29, supra note 142, at 60:30 (remarks 
by delegate from Brazil) (“Even though some countries support the view that existing 
international space law does not prohibit private commercial activities in celestial bodies, it 
is also true that the U.N. space treaties do not authorize such activities, particularly 
exploitation. And, indeed, a stronger case can be made to support this latter view.”).
163 COPUOS Mar. 29, supra note 142, at 110:24 (remarks by delegate from the United 
States).
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the need for additional discussion in COPUOS, the United States deliberately 
noted that the terms of the Outer Space Treaty could not be interpreted by 
COPUOS but only by the states parties to the Treaty.164 Given this ongoing 
debate, it is clear that the Space Resource Act does not yet represent an agreed 
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty as it pertains to private entities and 
space resources. 
It may still be possible for the United States to establish such agreement. 
However, since some countries have already raised objections to the U.S. 
law,165 they and others will likely reject approaches to implement the Space 
Resource Act that appear to be self-serving or in blatant disregard to the Outer 
Space Treaty’s overall purpose to promote peace and cooperation in the 
exploration and use of outer space. To overcome existing objections and 
establish agreement among the parties, the United States will need to implement 
the law in a way that reflects a good-faith interpretation of the Treaty’s
obligations. As discussed in Part II, there are three elements to determining 
whether a treaty interpretation has been made in good faith. The first is the 
interpretation’s reasonableness. Second is the balancing of the rights of the 
parties and avoiding abuse of the interpreting party’s position. Third is the 
ability to give effect to all the treaty provisions. The following discussion 
proposes a good-faith interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty based on these 
elements.
First, consider again the basic rights and obligations regarding space 
resources and private entities as set out in the Outer Space Treaty. Article 1 says 
that “[o]uter space . . . shall be free for exploration and use by all States,”166 but 
it also says that exploration and use “shall be carried out for the benefit and in 
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development.”167 It could be argued that the mere use of space 
resources provides general benefits to humanity (and, presumably, all countries 
as a result) in compliance with the Outer Space Treaty by expanding the 
availability of resources that are scarce on Earth and promoting technological 
development.168 However, this is a weak argument since benefits would accrue 
                                                                                                                     
164 Id. at 115:48 (remarks by delegate from the United States) (“I also wanted to just go 
on record and recognize that the Legal Subcommittee does not have a mandate to offer 
definitions of treaty terms. The appropriate actors to interpret terms within a treaty are the 
state parties, so that’s just a fundamental reality of international law. . . . [W]e don’t think 
it’s appropriate as a general matter for this body to take on a specific role in defining 
particular terms . . . .”).
165 Significant objections were raised even before the 2017 COPUOS Legal 
Subcommittee meeting. E.g., Jeff Foust, Mining Issues in Space Law, SPACE REV. (May 9, 
2016), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2981/1 [https://perma.cc/VFH6-6BRK]
(recounting Russian statements that the Space Resource Act is “inconsistent 
with . . . international obligations” and “undermines the international legal regime”).
166 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. I, para. 2.
167 Id. art. I, para. 1.
168 See Galloway, supra note 69, at 31 (mentioning different attitudes toward the sharing 
of benefits).
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in this way equally well without the Outer Space Treaty. Therefore, a reasonable 
interpretation of the Treaty must assume that by specifying the spreading of 
benefits in the Outer Space Treaty, the states parties must have intended a 
spreading of benefits other than what would have occurred without the Treaty. 
Second, the Outer Space Treaty’s explicit recognition of a difference in the 
“degree of economic [and] scientific development”169 among countries points 
to an understanding that not all countries are themselves able to directly benefit 
from outer space being “the province of all mankind.”170 If a country is unable 
to build and launch rockets or create the technology to explore and use outer 
space, then outer space being the province of all mankind becomes a hollow 
sentiment, devoid of practical meaning to those who are not able to take 
advantage of it. The fact that the United States currently has private entities 
capable of engaging in commercial enterprises in outer space puts the United 
States in an advantageous position.171 The United States could exploit that 
position by, for example, mining as much space resource material as possible 
while other countries are still developing the technical capacity to do so. 
However, this would clearly be an abuse of its position. Instead, the United 
States has an obligation to balance its rights under the Treaty with those of the 
other parties, which could take the form of providing a benefit to other countries 
that are not currently in a position to directly obtain space resources themselves. 
Third, the sharing of benefits would also satisfy the need to give effect to 
all the treaty terms. A unilateral exploitation of outer space would essentially 
make the phrase “benefit . . . all countries” and related expressions ineffective 
because it would limit the benefits of space use to only those countries with 
space capabilities. Also, assuming that unilateral exploitation would engender 
opposition from those countries that do not benefit, such an approach would run 
counter to the obligation to undertake space activities “in the interest of 
maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-
operation and understanding.”172 Therefore, sharing of benefits must be integral 
to a good-faith interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty’s obligations.
V. USING THE SPACE RESOURCE ACT TO DEFINE OUTER SPACE TREATY 
OBLIGATIONS
What approaches could the United States take to implement (or modify) the
Space Resource Act in line with a good-faith interpretation of the Outer Space 
                                                                                                                     
169 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. I, para. 1.
170 Id.; supra Part III.B (discussing the term “province of all mankind”).
171 See Colin Dwyer & Geoff Brumfiel, WATCH: SpaceX Successfully Launches Most 
Powerful Rocket in Decades, NPR (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/02/06/583627592/watch-live-spacex-attempts-launch-of-powerful-falcon-heavy-
rocket [https://perma.cc/N78Q-UMVG].
172 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. III. Given the opposition already expressed by 
members of COPUOS, the potential for a negative impact on international peace and 
cooperation is very possible. See supra notes 159–62.
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Treaty’s obligations? Before considering specific approaches, it is helpful to 
keep in mind that there are practical, not just legal, reasons for making a good-
faith interpretation. First, the more generous the United States is in interpreting 
its obligations, the more likely other countries will be to agree to the 
interpretation thereby arriving more quickly at a clear legal framework that 
supports private enterprise in the United States. Second, because all parties to 
the Treaty, not just the United States, apply the same treaty terms, any agreed 
interpretations resulting from U.S. practice will be applicable to all the other 
countries too. Since other countries may not be far behind the United States in 
developing off-planet missions, the United States should be careful to only 
promote treaty interpretations that it wants applied to others as well.173 Finally, 
by applying the Treaty in good faith, the United States will generate 
international goodwill that may prove beneficial to both the country in its 
international relations and its businesses in terms of allowing, even promoting, 
international trade in space resources. 
With this in mind, the following sections present a variety of approaches to 
implementing the Space Resource Act in the context of a licensing or permitting 
process. These approaches range on a spectrum from minimal government 
involvement and maximum private-sector flexibility, to primarily government
directed with simplified private sector responsibilities. They will be presented 
in roughly this order. The approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive; it 
may be possible to provide several options for a license applicant to choose 
from. After each description, there is a discussion of potential positive and 
negative aspects of the approach. The one constant for all approaches is a desire 
for each approach to clearly satisfy the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty’s
obligations and encourage other countries to express their agreement with the 
approach. While each has a chance to succeed in this regard, the more aggressive 
approaches will likely produce better results, although they may be more 
difficult to achieve.
A. Enterprise-Driven Declaration of Benefits
Since the Space Resource Act specifies that space resource use and 
ownership must be in accordance with international obligations, at a minimum 
an applicant for a license174 to obtain space resources should be required to 
explain how its activities will satisfy the international obligation to 
                                                                                                                     
173 See supra Part III. China, in particular, appears to be poised to reach the Moon and 
begin a program of mining its resources. The United States should consider what kind of 
international standards it wants applied to China and other countries and then follow those 
standards.
174 Paul Stephen Dempsey, National Laws Governing Commercial Space Activities: 
Legislation, Regulation, & Enforcement, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 19 (2016) (describing 
licensing as “the bedrock of governmental regulation of commercial space activities,” and 
noting its role in “fulfill[ing] State obligations under international law”).
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“benefit . . . the interests of all countries.”175 This would be part of the 
application and review process established by federal agencies, such as the one 
used for the Moon Express application.176 To be meaningful, some level of 
specificity would be necessary, including exactly what benefit would be 
conveyed and who would be receiving it. For example, in a request for asteroid 
mining, an applicant might specify that a certain amount of the mined resource, 
or a certain percentage of the profit of the particular activity, would be given to 
a particular group of countries or an international organization that provides 
benefits to certain countries other than the United States.
This approach would make it clear there is a consideration of Outer Space 
Treaty obligations in the process, and, while the requirement is minimal, it can 
be used to encourage future conversations about what actions are sufficient to 
meet the obligations. This approach is simple in that it is an administrative action 
and could potentially be undertaken without additional legislation since the 
existing law already requires compliance with international obligations. Also, 
by minimizing government involvement and leaving specifics to the creativity 
of the private sector, this approach may produce some useful innovations by the 
private-sector applicants that could later be developed by the government into a 
more formal program, perhaps one similar to those contemplated in the Subparts 
below. 
On the negative side, this approach shifts the burden to the license applicant 
and still leaves unclear what actions will satisfy the Outer Space Treaty. It is 
possible that such an approach would be internationally viewed as the United 
States shirking its responsibility by shifting it to the private sector. Also, the 
private sector tends to prefer legal certainty, especially where investment cost is 
so high.177 As a result, this option may not be an improvement over the situation 
as it exists under current law.
                                                                                                                     
175 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1.
176 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the lead agency responsible for 
reviewing applications for launch of a payload in accordance with 14 C.F.R. § 415. 14 C.F.R. 
§§ 415.7, 415.51–.61 (2015); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 27. In particular, the FAA 
conducts a payload review, and then consults with other federal agencies to determine if 
launching the payload “would present any issues affecting public health and safety, safety of 
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the 
United States.” Id. However, the current process may not be adequate going forward. The 
FAA noted that “[f]uture missions may require additional authority to be provided to the 
FAA to ensure conformity with the Outer Space Treaty.” Id. In fact, the President’s Office 
of Science and Technology provided Congress with a proposal to make the review and 
approval process more applicable to new types of missions; however, no action has been 
taken to date. Letter from John P. Holdren, Dir. & Assistant to the President for Sci. & Tech., 
to Chairman Thune & Chairman Smith, Chairmen of the Commerce, Sci., & Transp. Comm.
4, 6–7 (Apr. 4, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/
csla_report_4-4-16_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG8X-VJC6].
177 See GANGALE, supra note 26, at 51–52; supra note 19.
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B. Direct Participation Requirement
Rather than placing the entire burden on the applicant, the government could 
create a more directed, but still flexible framework that translates the obligations 
of the Outer Space Treaty into specific requirements while still allowing 
applicants to determine the details of how to satisfy the requirements. Such a 
framework could be modeled on existing preference programs for government 
contracts.178 For example, the federal government requires at least 10% of funds 
in certain transportation programs to be spent on contracts with disadvantaged 
business enterprises (DBEs).179 This is in response to specific findings made by 
Congress about the need for the program and its ongoing usefulness.180
Similarly, Congress could establish findings that clarify how it understands the 
United States’ obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, and then establish 
minimum requirements for the participation of certain developing countries. For 
example, Congress could find that Outer Space Treaty obligations would be met 
if space resource activities directly benefit certain countries: countries without 
their own space capabilities,181 less developed countries based on criteria 
published by the United Nations,182 or countries identified by other criteria 
deemed appropriate by Congress.183
Under such a framework, for example, the U.S. government could designate 
a list of certain developing countries, a certain number of which must be 
participants in the applicant’s activity at a certain minimum aggregate level of
participation. The framework could establish different ways in which the 
country or countries must be involved to ensure benefits accrue directly to them, 
such as including the country as a direct investor in the resource enterprise, or 
employing nationals or companies from the country. For example, using the 
DBE model, Congress could identify a list of twenty eligible countries and 
                                                                                                                     
178 For example, the U.S. Department of Transportation administers a disadvantaged 
business enterprise (DBE) program. U.S. Dept. of Transp., Disadvantaged Business 
Enterprise (DBE) Program, TRANSPORTATION.GOV, https://www.transportation.gov/civil-
rights/disadvantaged-business-enterprise [https://perma.cc/6EE8-EXH8] (last updated Feb. 
17, 2016). Similarly, the State of Ohio has a preferential purchasing policy that favors 
domestic products. OHIO DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., STATE OF OHIO PROCUREMENT 
HANDBOOK FOR SUPPLIES AND SERVS. 43 (2007), https://procure.ohio.gov//pdf/pur_procmanual.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7ST5-KRZE] (“Buy America” and “Buy Ohio” programs).
179 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 
§ 1101(b)(3), 129 Stat. 1312, 1324 (2015).
180 Id. § 1101(b)(1)(B).
181 G.A. Res. 51/122, annex, ¶ 3 (Feb. 4, 1997) (requesting states “with relevant space 
capabilities . . . [to give particular attention to] developing countries and countries with 
incipient space programmes”). 
182 E.g., Human Development Index, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi [https://perma.cc/2NHM-4Z4K].
183 The United States could target, or exclude, particular countries to satisfy a variety of 
policy objectives. However, the requirement to benefit “all countries” should constrain this 
to some degree.
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require that at least five must be participants in a space resource activity and that 
10% of the overall expenditures for that activity must be spent on contracts with 
companies from the selected eligible countries.
An advantage to this approach is the flexibility it provides to the applicant 
to negotiate with specific beneficiaries and determine how they would benefit. 
The direct participation of countries in the applicant’s space resource enterprise 
may generate long-term relationships between U.S. businesses and businesses 
in other countries, and would have the potential to build capacity within the 
benefiting countries for producing or utilizing the technology or the resources 
included in the arrangement. This would have a lasting benefit for both countries 
even after the particular project ends.
In addition, this type of approach could also promote innovation in crafting 
arrangements to transfer benefits. This would be similar to the Xprize, which 
establishes a specific target and then leaves it to private enterprise to figure out 
how to achieve the target.184 Why should technology be the only area where 
innovation happens? Administrative issues could undoubtedly benefit from this 
type of innovation-driven approach as well. Compared to the Enterprise-Driven 
Declaration of Benefits, this approach would better ensure that benefits flow 
directly to developing countries, the private sector would have more clarity on 
what it must do to satisfy international law, and the spirit of the obligations in 
the Outer Space Treaty would be more clearly fulfilled.
A challenge to this approach would be verifying that nationals or companies 
are from the targeted country, and that their inclusion in the project would truly 
benefit that country. This may require a significant government administrative 
process to ensure contracts are truly going to nationals and companies of the 
eligible countries.185 There also would be costs to the applicants for negotiating 
and contracting for the necessary arrangements and for the ongoing 
management of contracts for the life of the project. In addition, this type of 
program would require additional legislation and additional administrative 
oversight beyond the existing licensing process. 
C. Space Resource Trust
Rather than requiring an applicant to obtain the direct participation of 
eligible beneficiary countries, an alternative approach would be to require the 
applicant to instead set aside a payment that would be directed to such 
beneficiaries. To accomplish this, an applicant would be required to set up a 
                                                                                                                     
184 What Is an Xprize?, XPRIZE, http://www.xprize.org/about/what-is-an-xprize 
[https://perma.cc/6HGW-3FAF] (describing Xprize competitions as “[s]olution-agnostic, 
defining the challenge and incentivizing teams around the world to find the most effective 
solutions”).
185 See, e.g., Unified Certification Program, OHIO DEP’T TRANSP., http://www.dot.state.
oh.us/Divisions/ODI/SDBE/Pages/UCP.aspx [https://perma.cc/F8FU-QDBH] (providing the 
forms and instructions to qualify for the DBE program in Ohio).
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space resource trust. This would be an irrevocable trust186 for the benefit of 
particular countries or an international organization whose purpose is to benefit 
particular countries. This type of arrangement would allow the applicant to 
obtain, use, or sell the resources on its own, without the participation of other 
parties, with a certain required share of the value of the resources (or profits, or 
some similar measure) being deposited in trust for the beneficiary countries. 
One advantage of this approach for applicants is eliminating the need (and 
cost) of negotiating and managing an arrangement with particular countries or 
organizations. It would be easier to simply pay a mineral extraction royalty, or 
some other type of payment, into a trust as the entirety of the applicant’s
obligation. This approach could be used as an alternative to the Direct 
Participation Requirement in situations where targeted countries are either not 
able or willing to participate in the enterprise, or the potential businesses or 
employees are not sufficiently qualified to meet the applicant’s needs. 
Another advantage includes protection of assets from direct political 
interference. Once set up in accordance with law, the trust would be privately 
managed so payments and beneficiaries would not be subject to political 
meddling the way a government program might be. There might also be the side 
benefit of space resource trusts developing into a new subsector of the trust 
industry as some professional trustees would develop connections with potential 
beneficiary organizations and countries and make the trust set-up process easier 
for potential applicants. In terms of meeting the obligations of the Outer Space 
Treaty, this approach has the potential to result in a lasting legacy for developing 
countries. For this to happen, the trusts would need to be recognized as 
charitable trusts, or some other type of perpetual trust. Also, at least some part 
of the corpus of the trust would need to be protected, with beneficiaries receiving 
funds primarily from the earnings of the trust. 
Given the high investment costs associated with space resource activities,
the amount of any required payment would need to be carefully considered so 
as not to stifle the nascent space resource industry. However, mineral extraction 
payments are common,187 and there are ways to structure such a requirement to 
be fair across different types of activities and resources. For example, a 
progressive rate system could be used, similar to the U.S. income tax code, to 
                                                                                                                     
186 Irrevocable Trust, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/irrevocabletrust.
asp [https://perma.cc/XK5H-B2QB] (“An irrevocable trust can’t be modified or terminated 
without the permission of the beneficiary. The grantor, having transferred assets into the 
trust, effectively removes all of [its] rights of ownership to the assets and the trust.”).
187 For example, Ohio collects a severance tax on the extraction of a variety of mineral 
resources such as clay, limestone, salt, coal, and oil, which produced almost $27 million in 
fiscal year 2015. OHIO DEP’T OF TAXATION, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 112, http://www.tax.ohio.
gov/Portals/0/communications/publications/annual_reports/2015_annual_report/2015_AR_Sectio
n_2_Severance_Tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y66-FXS3]. The federal government requires 
payments in the form of royalties, rentals, and bonuses for the extraction of resources from 
federal lands. Energy and Minerals, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://web.archive.org/web/2016
0305050841/https://www.blm.gov/es/st/en/prog/energy.html [https://perma.cc/K2SR-5L57].
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help ensure that start-ups or small businesses would not pay a disproportionately 
large amount relative to their profits.188
For applicants, a disadvantage of this approach would be the initial cost to 
set up the trust, the need to identify beneficiaries, and perhaps the possibility of 
future legal questions as the settlor of the trust; however, ongoing costs to 
manage the trust would be paid out of the revenues of the trust itself. Another 
potential difficulty might result if applicants end up only selecting a few 
countries repeatedly as beneficiaries, which would undercut the idea that the 
space resources should benefit all countries. The government may need to 
specify that there be a minimum number of beneficiary countries, or a maximum 
percentage benefit any one beneficiary can receive. Another variation would be 
to require that beneficiaries must be changed periodically. Although the 
contributions to the trust would be irrevocable, the applicant could retain a 
special power of appointment189 to periodically change beneficiaries. 
Designating an international organization as the beneficiary would also solve 
this problem as the organization would then be able to use the funds wherever 
it determined the need was greatest.
D. Human Heritage Wealth Fund
Instead of relying on an array of private arrangements to provide benefits 
piecemeal, the United States could instead create a single, national fund using a 
sovereign wealth fund model.190 Rather than safeguarding America’s sovereign 
wealth, this fund could be termed a “human heritage wealth fund” because it 
would safeguard some of the wealth obtained from the common resources of 
outer space, which is considered to be “the province of all mankind.”191
An independent agency would be established to administer the fund, and 
applicants would be required to deposit payments into the national fund instead 
                                                                                                                     
188 Progressive Taxes, IRS, https://apps.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/student/whys_thm
03_les03.jsp [https://perma.cc/N6WL-Q7X5] (“A progressive tax takes a larger percentage of 
income from high-income groups than from low-income groups and is based on the concept 
of ability to pay. . . . The U.S. federal income tax is based on the progressive tax system.”).
189 A special (or limited) power of appointment allows the settlor of a trust (in this case, 
the applicant) to change the beneficiaries as desired, but not to appoint itself as a beneficiary. 
Powers of Appointment, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfp/liquidity-
appointment-trusts/cfp3.asp?ad=dirN&qo=investopediaSiteSearch&qsrc=0&o=40186 [https://
perma.cc/ZJC8-LFAC].
190 According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, a sovereign wealth fund is “a
state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from balance of 
payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, 
governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from resource 
exports.” Of the five traditional classifications of such funds, two that are particularly 
relevant here are “Savings or Future Generation Funds” and “Strategic Development” funds. 
What Is a SWF?, SWFI, http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund/ [https://perma.cc/
47KY-75D6].
191 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1, para. 1.
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of private space resource trusts. The idea behind such a resource-based 
sovereign wealth fund would be to allow all humanity to currently benefit from 
space resources and to provide a legacy to benefit future generations. 
Considering the Outer Space Treaty’s provisions about benefiting “all 
countries” and “use of outer space [being] the province of all mankind,”192 this 
type of approach may come the closest to satisfying the altruistic quality of these 
obligations. If established, it appears such a fund would be the first of its kind.193
Advantages to this approach could be substantial. First, the United States
would stand to gain international goodwill. International reputation is a valuable 
commodity, and establishing such a ground-breaking fund for the general 
benefit of humanity would send a strong signal that the United States takes its 
international obligations seriously and is setting a high bar for everyone else. 
Second, the United States would get ahead of any criticisms that it is not meeting 
its international obligations. A program such as this would be difficult for other 
states to argue against given that it broadly interprets the obligations in the Outer 
Space Treaty and directly addresses the beneficial requirements imposed by 
them. Such a bold action would undoubtedly move the ball forward in 
discussions about the meaning of the Outer Space Treaty’s obligations, and the 
previously mentioned increase in goodwill would place the United States in a 
stronger position to help shape any clarification of those obligations.
Other benefits of this approach include simplicity for applicants, and the 
large potential for a legacy. Rather than having to establish their own trusts or 
negotiate participation with international partners, this provides a standardized 
and consistent requirement that applicants can easily account for in their plans. 
It would also be easier for beneficiaries of one fund to be adjusted over time by 
the administering agency, as compared to the beneficiaries of a multitude of 
trusts. 
Over the long term, if the fund is managed to preserve the corpus and create 
a legacy that provides benefits only from the earnings of the fund, the eventual 
size of the earnings could allow the United States to save taxpayer dollars by 
reducing its foreign aid budget.194 Countries benefiting from the human heritage 
wealth fund may not require the same level of aid, so current foreign aid funds 
could be reallocated for other purposes domestically. Also, the agency’s costs 
                                                                                                                     
192 Id.
193 Currently, it appears that all sovereign wealth funds have been established for the 
benefit of a particular single country or subnational jurisdiction. See Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Rankings, SWFI, http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/
76RJ-CL5J].
194 The world’s largest sovereign wealth fund (Norway) recently surpassed $1 trillion in 
value. Holly Ellyatt & Katrina Bishop, The World’s Biggest Sovereign Wealth Funds in 
2017: 1. Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, CNBC (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/17/the-worlds-biggest-sovereign-wealth-funds.html#slide=11 
[https://perma.cc/U6VY-8FSR]. If the Norway fund earns a relatively modest 5% annually, its 
earnings in 2018 will be at least $50 billion. By comparison, the total U.S. foreign aid budget 
for fiscal year 2018 is planned to be only $25.8 billion. FOREIGNASSISTANCE.GOV,
http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/ [https://perma.cc/3MM5-TCPD].
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would be borne by the fund, so no administrative costs would be passed on to 
taxpayers.
Challenges to this approach include significant political issues. First is the 
need for legislation to establish a new agency and national fund for an 
unprecedented purpose. Significant political will would be needed and advocacy 
groups may be potentially difficult to find as the beneficiaries of the fund would 
be primarily foreign entities. Another political challenge is the potential of funds 
being raided by Congress to satisfy short-term budget needs.195 The U.S. 
government may also attempt to use the fund as a foreign policy tool. Rather 
than keeping to the broader perspective of the fund as benefitting all countries, 
there will be a temptation to use the fund as leverage to reward friends or punish 
opponents. The administering agency needs to be as independent as possible, 
and could be modeled on other federal agencies that enjoy a significant degree 
of insulation from day-to-day political whims.196
There is the possibility, in the long term, of setting up an international 
organization to serve as trustee of the funds to administer in accordance with the 
direction of the international community. This would serve to remove the funds 
from the reach of domestic U.S. politics and reduce the political challenges 
noted above. However, using an international organization could also generate 
its own controversy.197
                                                                                                                     
195 In the past, the same has happened with the national Social Security Trust Fund and 
Highway Trust Fund. Merrill Matthews, What Happened to the $2.6 Trillion Social Security 
Trust Fund?, FORBES (July 13, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/Merrillmatthews/2011/07/
13/what-happened-to-the-2-6-trillion-social-security-trust-fund/#2bb2080b4947 [https://perma.cc/
EY32-S6XY] (explaining how even though the government created a special trust fund to 
retain assets for Social Security, Congress has borrowed those funds for other purposes, 
thereby requiring current Social Security expenses to be paid with borrowed funds); Tax 
Analysts, The Gas Tax Doesn’t Work Because Politicians Broke It, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2013), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2013/10/24/the-gas-tax-doesnt-work-because-politicians-
broke-it/#441250a46bf1 [https://perma.cc/CV5K-ZVUT] (explaining how Congress redirected 
taxes earmarked for the Highway Trust Fund to deficit reduction from 1990–1997).
196 The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve are commonly 
viewed as enjoying a significant measure of independence from political actors. Adrian 
Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2013). 
A combination of formal and informal factors come together to truly create independence 
for an agency. Id. at 1197–98 (describing how the Federal Reserve’s independence results 
from the combination of the politics of the process of appointing the Chair, public perception, 
and an apparent belief by presidents that affording independence to the Federal Reserve is 
good policy). 
197 The U.N. Oil-for-Food exchange program, while not a trust, was a similar program 
at the international level where Iraqi oil revenues were placed in escrow for the benefit of 
the Iraqi people with a U.N. agency serving as gatekeeper for the funds. Office of the Iraq 
Programme, About the Programme: Oil-for-Food, http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/
index.html [https://perma.cc/3V7G-M76J] (last updated Nov. 4, 2003). Unfortunately, 
controversy enveloped the program, resulting in a formal inquiry that revealed bribes and 
kick-backs. Press Release, Head of Oil-For-Food Inquiry Calls for Wide-Ranging Reform 
Within United Nations, U.N. Press Release IK/524-ORG/1449 (Oct. 27, 2005), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/ik524.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/PRQ8-SBDA].
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A significant benefit to this arrangement, however, is that it allows the 
United States to shift the debate about who benefits from the space resource 
activities into the lap of the international community. The United States would 
have done its part in creating a benefit; it could not then be criticized for whether 
and how those benefits are distributed. The international community would then 
be responsible for making these decisions.198 This would also be the clearest 
way for the United States to satisfy its obligation to benefit all countries—by 
giving all countries collectively both rights and duties over the funds.
As discussed above, there are several possible approaches for attempting to 
satisfy the Outer Space Treaty’s obligations even without international 
agreement as to the exact nature of the obligations. Since it seems that an 
international agreement clarifying the Outer Space Treaty’s obligations is 
unlikely to occur in the near future,199 the United States is in a position to 
attempt to shape the international understanding of the obligations and methods 
of satisfying them through its own practice.200 The Human Heritage Wealth 
Fund provides the most direct evidence of a good-faith effort to interpret and 
implement the obligations, which encourages other countries to follow suit. It 
balances the United States’ interests in pursuing resource extraction, while still 
recognizing the rights of other parties to the Outer Space Treaty. It would not 
abuse the United States’ position as the first country to pursue resource 
extraction, and would give effect to all the treaty provisions, including those 
promoting the use of space for the benefit of all countries. Although the political 
challenges would be significant, they will only increase as time passes. After 
companies actually begin extraction, any legal changes could result in 
substantial financial consequences. Now is the time for the United States to be 
a leader and pursue a path that has broad benefits for everyone.
                                                                                                                     
198 Such an international regime was established by the 1994 Agreement to the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding the extraction and use of minerals on the deep 
seabed. About the International Seabed Authority, INT’L SEABED AUTHORITY,
https://www.isa.org.jm/authority [https://perma.cc/4ZHF-QY77] (“The International Seabed 
Authority is an autonomous international organization . . . through which States Parties to 
the Convention shall, in accordance with the regime for the seabed and ocean floor and 
subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (the Area) . . . , organize and control 
activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area.”). 
The Moon Agreement contemplates an international regime governing space resources, but 
such a regime has not been created. Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11, para. 5.
199 Simpson, supra note 12, at 182 (noting what seems to be “a treaty-averse political 
climate in the United States and elsewhere”). 
200 See id. at 183 (suggesting that an international regime be created through the 
coordination of national laws rather than through a treaty); von der Dunk, supra note 69, at 
28 (“[U]ltimately it is up to the states concerned to create the state practice and opinio juris
which could lead to authoritative interpretations [of issues raised by the Outer Space 
Treaty].”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As recently as the 1950s, humanity had only dreams and aspirations of 
reaching outer space. The launch of the first Sputnik changed the world forever, 
and humanity rapidly began to realize some of those fantastic dreams. Although 
the pace of progress has slowed, with no manned missions beyond Earth orbit 
since 1972,201 dreams and aspirations continue.
The legal regime that was created in the 1960s put in place a visionary 
foundation meant to guide future space activities. While it has worked so far, 
the world is now facing situations that this venerable foundation does not have 
the details to address. Technological progress is quickly providing us with the 
possibility of mining resources on the Moon, asteroids, and possibly even Mars 
and beyond. Who controls these resources? Can they be owned? By whom, and 
under what circumstances? These questions remain inadequately answered as 
international space law stands today. As history has repeatedly shown, where 
there are valuable resources, conflict often results when control of those 
resources is unclear.
The ability of humanity to avoid resource conflicts in space is critical to the 
realization of the ideals of the Outer Space Treaty. These ideals are worth 
realizing because they provide the foundation upon which humanity can reshape 
its future. In the apparent absence of a willingness to explicitly clarify the Outer 
Space Treaty, it is the subsequent practice of the parties to the Treaty that will 
shape the detailed understanding of rights and obligations with regard to space 
resources. The United States has gone out on a limb to recognize private rights 
in space resources in a new law without the support of other countries; it now 
must use its law to shape the actions of other states into subsequent practice.
Since agreement is the necessary element of subsequent practice, only an 
approach to implementing the United States’ law that encourages participation 
by other countries will achieve its goals, not an approach that leads to objections. 
This is a chance for the United States to both get behind private enterprise, 
recognizing it as the main driver of future space activities, and to ensure that 
space is truly a frontier for all of humanity. Outer space is vast, and so are its 
resources. Why not start the next chapter of human endeavor in space by sharing 
its vast benefits with an inclusive and ambitious vision? Done right, such a 
vision might even put the United States in the captain’s chair leading humanity’s
next leap into space with a willing world community.
                                                                                                                     
201 The last manned mission to the Moon, Apollo 17, returned to Earth on December 19, 
1972. The Apollo 17 Mission, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/history/apollo/apollo17/index.html [https://perma.cc/VHD4-8WM4] 
(last updated July 2, 2009).
